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Mitchell et al v. Mandel 
This case involves the validity of Section 212(a)(28) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the Mccarren Act), 
which prescribes classes of aliens eligible to receive visas. 
Mandel, a Belgium marxist, is in a prohibited class, but 
the statute authorizes the Attorney General to admit an alien 
"temporarily despite his inadmissibility". 
Mandel sought a visa to lecture in the U.S.; the Secretary -
of State recommended approval, but the Attorney General refused. 
Mandel, together with several U.S. citizens, brought this 
action to declare the statute unconstitutional as a violation 
of the First Amendment rights of the U.S. citizens who wish to 
hear Mandel. ~ ~--~ ~ ~~ rv-- ,...0 _. .~.r~ ~t··,- . 7lcA. ~~~ '-4.-~ °"'~ ~. 
Two members o the three judge court held that the statute 
violated First Amendment freedoms, the third judge dissenting. 
Both opinions are elaborate and scholarly. 
The Solicitor General's Jurisdictional Statement states that: 
"This Court has repeatedly held that the l 
decision to exclude (aliens) and the grounds 
for admissibility are not matters for judicial 
inquiry." 
Cases cited by the S.G. include: Mishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 
142 U.S. 651, 659; Boutilier v. Immigration Service, 387 U.S. 118, 
123; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (quoting Mr. Justice 
2 . 
Frankfurter); United States v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537; and 
United States v. Williams, 195 U.S. 279; see also Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S . 580. 
The majority opinion of the three judge court takes the 
"-------- -
position - if I understand c---- it correctly - that the power to 
£xclude aliens is not absolute and is subject to judicial review. 
The opinion draws a distinction between exclusion where the 
alien advocates "violent revolution or subversion by revoluntionary 
communism" (page 14A of S.G. 's brief), and the mere advocacy of 
marxist philosophy. The Court relies on Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 491, 508-512; Yeatts v. U. S., 354 U.S. 298, 324-325; 
and several other cases. 
It appears from the opinions - although not entirely clearly 
that all of the cases relied on by the majority of the three 
k ~ 
judge court involve U.S. citizens~ the deportation of aliens :~ 
already in the United States pursuant to valid entry. 
If my preliminary reading of these opinions is correct, 
this case presents a challenge to the established doctrine that 
the power to exclude aliens is not subject to judicial review or 
limited by the Bill of Rights. 
Before making my final decision, I would like to know whether 
the line of cases cited in the S.G. 's brief will, in effect, be 
overruled if appellee's position is sustained? 
w 
3. 
I would also like to know, if Mandel's position is sustained, 
what limits - if any - would then exist on the right of each 
American citizen (claiming First Amendment protection) to 
insist that a particular alien be admitted unless the Government 
can prove that such alien (within the Dennis doctrine) will 
advocate violent revolution or subversion by revoluntionary 
communism? 
* * * * * 
As a matter of policy, the statute in question seems to 
me to be too broad and possibly lacking in appropriate standards. 
My concern is whether (i) the judiciary, vindicating First Amend-
ment rights of U. S. citizens, has the constitutional authority 
to interfere with what should be a legislative and executive 
responsibility; and (ii) whether if the court below is affirmed, 
the effect will be to overrule a long line of Supreme Court 
decisions. 
It is also difficult for me to see, as a matter of 
administration of the immigration laws, how any alien can be 
excluded or denied a visa without the real risk of some friend 
who is a U.S. citizen demanding judicial review. 
No. 71-16 OT 1971 A Hold for Nine Case 
John N. Mitchell et al. v. Ernest Mandel et al. 
/1 i\ 
Appeal from USDC for EDNY (3-Judge Court)(Feinberg, Circuit Judge, 
~
Bartels & Dooling)(Bartels, USDJ, dissenting) 
First Amendment; Exclusion of Aliens. 
r·· . . . 
Appellee Mandel is a citi:?en .and resident of Belgium. He is 
~ a member of the Communist Party, but he is an orthodox Marxist 
of the the Trotskyist school. He is editor-in-chief of the Belgian 
Left Socialist Weekly, and the author of a two volume work entitled 
Marxist Economic Theory. He is an academic advocate of the 
doctrine of Marxism, but the Govt does not contend that he has 
at any time ever attempted to incite subversive action. The appellees 
other than Mandel are citizens of the US who had issued invitations 
to Mandel in 1969 to participate in conferences and to speak at 
universities and other forums in the us. 
Sectiom 212(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality 
. ~ ·-:::.... 
Abt of~. 8 USC 1182(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v), provide thats 
••• the following classes of aliens shall be 
ineligible to receive ~a~ and shall be excluded 





(28) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, 






(D) Aliens • • • who advocate the economic O international, and governmental doctrines of World communism or the 
establishment in t fie United States of a totalitarian 
dictatorship ••• 
(G) 
* * -1, * 
Aliens who write or publish ••• any ••• 
matter ••• advocating or teaching, , • (v) 
the economic, international, and governmental doctrines 
of world communism , • , • 
Pursuant to this statute, Mandel was and is ineligible for a ----The statute has an exception, however, which 
.. 
• provides in pertinent part: 
••• an Lineligibl~7 alien ••• may, after approval 
by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the 
Secretary of State ••• that the alien be admitted 
temporarily despite his inadmissibility, }?e granted 
Sl!Ch a visa and may be admitted into the United States 
temporar1.ly as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the 
Attorney General •••• 
The Secretary of State recommended that Mandel be granted a --------- -
nonimmigrant visa for the contemplated 6 day vist and lecture 
~ - ---
tour, but the Attorney General refused to grant the requested 
- ----waiver and visa, despite the fact that Mandel had been admitted 
into the US in 1962 and again in 1968 pursuant to recommendations 
by the Secretary of State , a~d waivers by the ,. then Attorneys General, 
Appellees then commenced this suit against the Sec. of State 
and the AG, claiming that the statutory exclusion provisions are 
unconstitutional, and that their application to Mandel was in 
~ ------
any event unconstitutionally arbitrary and unreasonable. The Chief 
Judge of CA 2 ordered a ~judge cou_;:__t convened in USDC for ED NYa 
and ~he ~SDC held the political exclu_;ion provisions of the statute /I 
unconstitutional 1!.§ applied J;,Q Mandel, enjoined the Govt from --
applying the political exclusion provisions to deny Mandel admission 
; 
,. 
to the US as a nonimmigrant visitoro and ordered the appellants to · 
grant a nonimmigrant visa to Mandel. Relief was limited to Mandel 0 s 
case (the statute was declared unconstitutional as a plied, rather , 
than unc=stitutional :n--;ts face). ~~~I>-}~/~~~· 
.i..;_ ~+- 0, - S'...eG~ .;_ , '2- lc.) (1-'i?) 7 
The Govt did not base its refusal to grant the visa on any ~ y.> 2--
'15 G-' 
claim that Mandel has subversive affiliations, that his presence ~ _ 
in the US would endanger the national security, or that his exclu-
sion is dictated by foreign policy considerationso Indeed, ~ 
Govt did not identify apy governmental interest involved, giving no 
---------reason for excluding Mandel, but relying instead on the discretion of 
the Attorney General. 
The crux of the USOC's opinion is that appellees' 1st amend• 
ment rights have been infringed by the Govt in this case. Over the ,, 
last decade, this Court has noted that the 1st amendment "protects l / 
the right to_ receive informationj and ideas." Stanley y. Georgia, 
~ -------- -- ' ~ - .. 
394 US 557, 564 (1969). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. y. FCC, 
395 US 367, 389-90 (1969); Lamont y. Postmaster General, 381 US 
301, 305-07 (1965). The USOC followed these cases to conclude 
that this case involves primarily the 1st amendment rights of 
the American appellees, rather than any rights of appellee Mandel. 
..... -·--- --
Neither the Govt nor the dissent in the USDC takes the position - ..._ 
that appellees' 1st amendment rights are not involved. The position 
• 
of the Govt seems to be that, in the lawful pursuit of proper 
foreign policy and national security objectives, the Govt may have 
in this case had an "incidental" effect on appellees' 1st amendmemt 
rights, and that such "incidental" effect is permissable since it 
is necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose sought to be 
achieved. 
The :e_osition of the Govt in this case is somewhat analo@ous 
--- -- -
to its position in the "Pentagon Papers" case. In both cases 1st -------amendment rights were at stake, although in this case those 1st 
amendment rights are of a different character. In both cases the ,, 
, ,. . 
Govt argued that the Constitution conferred upon it powers and 
responsibilities that must override any 1st amendment considerations. 
In this case those constitutional powers and responsibilities are 
denominated "foreign policy" and "national security~ This Court 
has recognized that 1st amendment rights enjoy a preferred position 
under our constitutional scheme, and that "any system of prior 
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional validity." New York Times Co. 
v. United States, 403 US 713 (1971). The Govt refused to offer 
any justification for the exclusion of Mandel in this case, thus ------------- - ---...._---.. -- - ~ 
the Govt would appear to come up short should any "balancing" 
test be applied, for the Govt has advanced nothing to put on its 
side of the scales. 
As noted above, relief in this case was limited to Mandel. 
Presumably the Govt can in any future case challenging its 
right to exclude aliens under the authority of the two subsections 
of the statute involved in this case prevail upon ~showing of 
the reasons for excluding the particular alien involved. Since 
the Govt handles these matters on a ·case-by-case basis, they 
presumably have a reason for exclusion in cases where exclusion 
is ordered. The decision below leaves untouched the many sections 
of the statute (literally dozens) which declare aliens ineligible 
for visas 
for a variety of specific reasons unrelated to publications and 
beliefs. I would therefore avoid this 1st amendment can of 
worms at this time by joining Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and 
Marshall in voting to AFFIRM. 
7 
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No. 71-16 MITCHELL v. MANDEL 
Argued 4/18/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
This involves the refusal of the Attorney General to approve a 
temporary visa for Prof. Mandel, a Belgian Marxist who had been 
invited to speak at various American colleges. 
The !migration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S. C. 1182(a)(28)(D) 
and (G)(v)), provides in part that: 
"The following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to 
receive visas and shall be excluded from admission 
into the United States: 
* * * * * 
"(D) Aliens ... who advocate the economic . 
doctrines of world Communism . . . " 
Under this statute, Mandel was ineligible for a WJJ~ visa. But 
the statute allows the Attorney General, upon recommendation of the 
Secretary of State, to authorize a temporary visa despite the normal 
rule of the statute. 
Mandel had been admitted to the country in 1962 and again in 
1968. Although the Secretary of State recommended an exception this 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study and have dis-
cussion with the appropriate law clerk before the Conference. My 




time, the Attorney General denied the visa. The only reason indicated 
in the record (Exhibit Q, p. 68 of the Appendix) is a statement in a 
letter from the Immigration Service stating that on his 1968 trip Mr. 
Mandel was guilty of a "flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him". 
There is evidence in the record that Mandel's failure to comply with 
conditions was inadvertent or unknowingly. 
Suit was instituted by Mandel and various professors, avering 
denial of First Amendment rights, asserting that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to Mandel, and that in any event the action 
of the AG was arbitrary and capricious. 
A three-judge court sustained the complaint, and held that 
plaintiffs were entitled to the injunction. The court held that although 
Mandel had no individual right to enter the country "the citizens of the 
country (have the right under the First Amendment) to have the alien 
enter and have him KXJ!liar explain and seek to defend his views." Thus, 
a first amendment right was found to exist with respect to American 
citizens who wished to hear the views of any alien. 
Judge Bartels dissented, expressing the view that the policy 
expressed in the statute (national security and foreign policy considera-
tions) overrode any First Amendment interest citizens may have in 
bringing aliens into the country. 
, ,. . 
3. 
Position of Appellees in this Court: 
As pointed out in the reply brief of the SG, and as borne out by 
the oral argument, appellees no longer predicate their case in any 
significant degree on the unconstitutionality of the statute. The focus 
of their attack has shifted to the alleged arbitrary and capricious 
exercise by the Attorney General of his discretion to waive an alien's 
inadmissibility. 
This is quite a shift in position, certainly from that taken by 
the district court - which held the statute unconstitutional as applied 
to appellees. If the statute, as so applied, is unconstitutional, the 
Attorney General had no discretion to exercise. 
Mr. Boudin admitted in oral argument that, under the statute, 
some people could be excluded in the sound exercise of discretion. 
He emphasized that the public interest in education - and free speech 
on the campus - placed professors in a different and higher category 
than other classes of mortals. To use his term, Mr. Boudin argued 
that there are'gradations" of interest in free speech, and that there is 
a greater interest on the campus than elsewhere. 
He also argued that the Attorney General could not have"unfettered 
discretion". While Boudin was not clear, he apparently thinks the 
4. 
statute should provide standings, and perhaps a due process type 
hearing, before the Attorney General can exercise his judgment. Mr. 
Boudin ignored the fact that the broad policy of the statute is to exclude 
persons like Mandel. I must say that, to me, this policy is a stupid 
one - certainly at this time. But it could hardly be an unconstitutional 
policy, unless this statute were discriminatorily applied. 
Boudin' s argument would require the admission of Mandel 
because invited by college professors, but would exclude an alien 
invited say - by the Moose Lodge, or the Daughters of the Confederacy. 
My Tentative View: 
Although this case troubles me because I am not in sympathy 
tl 
with the statute, and also because the Attorney General exercise - in ,, 
my view - extraordinarily poor judgment I am still in doubt as to how 
I shall vote. 
It seems clear to me that Congress has the right to exclude 
any and all aliens, so long as this is done on a nondiscriminatorial 
basis. 
It is also clear to me that a majority of the three-judge court 
made an absurdly unsound judgment in holding that the First Amendment 
gives the right to any American citizen to "hear" and "debate with" 
•' 
5, 
any foreigner whom he may wish to bring into the United States. This 
would make an utter shambles of the immigration laws. 
This leaves me with onlythe argument - pressed by Boudin -
that the AG had a discretionary role and that he exercised it abitrarily 
and capriciously. But here, on must remember that the statute 
excluded all aliens in Mandel's class, and provided only for a limited 
exception by the Attorney General. It is not clear to me how Congress 
could prescribe any meaningful standards. Nor is it clear that any 
type of "due process" hearing is necessary under the Constitution or 
indeed would be feasible to adminster. 
I will await the discussion. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THUR G OOD MARSHALL 
.invrtnu <!}01ttt of tfyt 'J!ittitt~ j;tnftg 
'D'allltin9fott, ~. <!}. 2ll&i'!~ 
May 3, 1972 
Memorandum for the Chief Justice 
Re: No. 71-16 - Mitchell v. Mandel 
While I appreciate the assignment of this 
opinion to me and have worked on it almost continuously 
since that time, I sincerely regret that I find myself 
unable to write it. As a matter of fact, I am con-
vinced that my vote was in error. 
You will remember that my vote was to agree 
because "we had come too far to turn back." However, 
my further research convinces me that I am not in 
accord with The Chinese Exclusion Case and r: , not agree 
that the Constitution gave to either Congress or the 
Executive the broad power they assert. 
As I said before Iam s :ry, but I will 
have to go down as a "backslider." 
j1~ 
T.M. 










JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.§lt).lrtlttC ~omt of tltt ~1ttitdl ~tafrg 
~11a$Iti1tnto11, p. <.q. 2 t\CiJt,~i 
June 8, 1972 
71-16, Kleindienst v. Mandel 
Dear Harry, 
I agree with your memorandum, 
which I hope will become the opinion of the 
Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
() <; ' 
'/ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 






.. ,m, <IJoud., lift~ ... 
.... Jpqtou. ,. QJ. 20~, 
C H.AMl!SERS 9,-
.JU S Tl CE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 12, 1972 
Re: No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. Mandel 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
Copies to the Conference 
i .. ·-
,. 




MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
Rea No. 71-16, Kleindienst (Mitchell) y. Mandel 
This is the HOLD-FOR-NINE 1st amendment right to hear 
case, involving the power of the Executive Branch to deny 
visas to aliens seeking entry into this country for the 
purpose of delivering lectures. 
The USDC (2"to"l) held that US citizens had a fitst amend-
ment right to hear Mandel, and held the statutes authorizing 
the AG to deny admission to aliens because of their beliefs 
BBZB unconstitutional. 
The Conference voted to reverse; you voted to reverse. -
HAB has circulated an opinion for the Court, which PS 
and Rehnquist have joined. WOD has circulated a dissent. ---------HAB recognizes the existence of a limited first amendment 
right to hearp and he also recognizes the plenary power of 
~
the XXlfttlO(YV)f Legislative Branch to formulate rules for the 
exclusion of aliens, He concludes the opinion by holdings 
In summary, plenary congressional power to make 
policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has 
long been firmly established. In the case of 
an alien excludable under 8212(a)(28), Congress 
has delegated conditional exercise of this power 
to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive 
exercises this power negatively on the basis of 
a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the 
courts will neither look behind the exercise of 
that discretion, nor test it by balancing its 
justification against the First Amendment interests 
of those who seek personal communication with the 
/ , 
-2-
applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds 
may be available for attacking exercise of discre" 
tion for which no justification whatsoever is 
advanced is a question we neither address nor 
decide in this case, 
WOD's dissent emphasizes that national security is not 
involved, and that the majority's decision makes the AG a 
censor of ideas, The guts of WOD's opinion is1 
Thought control is not within the 11:sairiBBB 
competence of any branch of government, Those who 
live here may need exposure to the ideas of people 
of many faiths and many creeds to further their 
education, We should construe the Act generously 
by that First Amendment standard, saying that once 
the State Department has concluded that our 
foreign relations permit or require the admission 
of a foreign traveller, the Attorney General is 
left only with the IIBJIBXX problems of national 
security, importation of heroin, or other like 
matters within his competence, 
WOD, in other words, has written on statutory rather than 
constitutional grounds, 
HAB 0 s opinion is very narrow. It addresses only the 
narrow issue in this case, There are doubtless some on 
the Court who would have preferred a broader opinion, giving 
plenary exclusion power to the AG in all cases, irrespective 
of whether the AG seeks to justify his exercise of the power. 




71-16 Kleindienst v. Mandel 
: 
,, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
~up-rt1ttt (!j:cnttt cf tl1 t 'Jttttitt~ ~tttf.tg 
'JWag~foghttt, ~. <!f. ZOJiJtc'.) 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J. BRENNAN, JR. June 16, 1972 
RE: No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. Mandel 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your dissent in the 
above. 
Mr. J us tic e Mar shall 
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MEMORANDUM TO MR, JUSTICE POWELL 
Rea No, 71-16, Kleindienst (Mitchell) y, Mandel, DISSENT 
of Justice Marshall 
Justice Marshall has circulated a dissent, which 
Justice Brennan has joined, WOD has also circulated a 
dissent, which I discussed in my memo on HAB's opinion for 
the Court, 
Marshall 0 s dissent strikes me as being very well written, 
and it makes what seems to me to be the strongest case for 
his position, The dissent turns on what the First Amendment 
requires in cases where the rights of American citizens are 
at issue, 
.hFtmt Q+nri of tlf•~· ... 
... ~ J. ~- 2.IJJ"' 
CHAMl!IERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 19, 1972 
Re: No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. 
Mandel 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 




THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
,ju:vumt QJcurt cf tfyt ~tlt ,jtatts-
Jhtiifyhtghm. ,. QJ. 2llffe~~ 
June 22, 1972 
Re: No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. Mandel 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
, 
THE C. J. W. 0. D. W. J.B. P. S. B. R. W. T. l\I. H. A. B. L. F . P. W. H. R. 
1~A-~>I .... ,_ .. S" I 'i /-, "'-- ·- , . 
'I,..;," 
. . 
~ ~ !iW../0 rl)l7f?; ; . ~ ~ ~(; ,JA~ ,-11>'6 ~ J.J fJ I:> ~ /s/1,.; ~ ,f 1'/}r"' ,1~-..f,-v t./1,/-,v J'/J/rv- "''"' ,_,..,, 
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MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, Memorandum. 
The appellees have framed the issue here as follows: 
"Does appellants' action in refusing to allow an 
alien scholar to enter the country to attend aca-
demic meetings violate the First Amendment rights 
of American scholars and students who had invited 
him?" I 
Expressed in statutory terms, the question is whether 
§§ 212 (a) (28) (D) and (G) (v) and § 212 (d) (3) (A) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 
182- 185, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182 (a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) 
and § 1182 ( d) (3)(A), providing that certain aliens 
"shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded 
from admission into the United States" unless the At-
torney General, in his discretion, upon recommendation 
by the Secretary of State or a consular officer, waives 
inadmissibility and approves temporary admission , are 
unconstitutional as applied here in that they deprive 
American citizens of freedom of speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment. 
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The challenged provisions of the statute are: 
"Section 212 (a). Except as otherwise provided 
in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be 
ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from 
admission into the United States: 
"(28) Aliens who arc, or at any time have been, 
members of any of the following classes: 
"(D) Aliens not within any of the other pro-
visions of this paragraph who advocate the eco-
nomic, international, and governmental doctrines of 
world communism or the establishment in the 
United Statrs of a totalitarian dictatorship .... 
"(G) Aliens who write or publish ... (v) the 
economic, international, and govcrnme1ital doctrines 
of ·world communism or the establishment in the 
United States of a totalitarian dictatorship ... 
"(cl) .... 
"(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an 
alien (A) who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa 
and is known or believed by the consular officer to 
be ineligible for such visa under one or more of the 
paragraphs enumerated in subsection (a) ... may, 
after approval by the Attorney General of a ree-
ommendatioH by the Secretary of State or by the 
consular officer that the alien be admitted tempo-
rarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted such 
a visa and may be admitted into the United States 
temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of 
the Attorney General .... " 
Section 212 (a) (6) provides that the Attorney General 
"shall make a detailed report to the Congress in any 
case in which he exercises his authority under paragraph 
71-113-0PINTON 
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( 3) of this subsection on behalf of any alien excludable 
under paragraphs (9), (10). and (28) " 
T 
Ernest E. Mandel resides in Brussels, Belgium, and 
is a Belgian citizen. He is a professional journalist 
and is editor-in-chief of the Belgian Left Socialist weekly 
La Gauche. He is author of a two-volume work en-
titled "Marxist Economic Theory" published in 1969. 
He asserted in his visa applications that he is not a 
member of the Communist Party. He has described 
himself, however. a.s "a revolutionary Marxist." 2 He 
does not dispute, see 325 F. Supp., at 624, that he ad-
vocates the economic, governmental , and international 
doctrines of world communism.a 
Mandel was admitted to the United States tempo-
rarily in 1962 and again in 1968. On the first visit 
he came as a working journalist. On the second he 
accepted invitations to speak at a number of universi-
ties and colleges. On each occasion, although appar-
ently he ,vas not then aware of it, his admission fol-
lowed a finding of ineligibility under § 212 (a) (28), and 
the Attorney General's exercise of discretion to admit 
him temporarily, on recommendatio11 of the Secretary 
of State, as § 212 (d)(3)(A) permits. 
On Sptember 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the Amer-
ican Consul in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to 
enter the United States in October for a six-clay period 
during which he would participate in a. conference on 
2 E. Mandel, ReYolutionary Strategy in the Imperialist Countries 
(19G9), reprint rel in Apprndix 5.J-GG. 
" fn their brief, appellcc:<, \l"hile ~up;gf'sti11g i11:1t § 101 (:1)(40), de-
fining "world comrnnni:<m," and§ 212 (a) (28) (D) arc unacceptably 
n1gue, "do not ronie~t ihc fact that appellnnts ran and do condude 
that Dr. Mnndel's Marxist econornir philo ophy falls within the cope 
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"Technology and the Third World" at Stanford Uni-
versity.1 He had been invited to Stanford by the Grad-
uate Student Association there. The invitation stated 
that John Kenneth Galbraith would present the key-
note address and that Mandel would be expected to 
participate in an ensuing panel discussion and to give a 
major address the following day. The University, 
through the office of its president, "heartily endorse [ d]" 
the invitation. When Mandel's intended visit became 
known, additional invitations for lectures and confer-
ence participations came to him from members of the 
faculties at Princeton, Amherst, Columbia, and Vassar, 
from groups in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and New 
York City, and from others. One conference was to 
be in New York City sponsored jointly by the Bertrand 
Russell Peace Foundation and the Socialist Scholars 
Conference; Mandel's assigned subject there was "Rev-
olutionary Strategy in Imperialist Countries." Mandel 
then filed a second visa application proposing a more 
extensive itinerary and a stay of greater duration. 
On October 23, the Consul at Brussels informed 
Mandel orally that his application of September 8 had 
been refused. This was confirmed in writing on Octo-
ber 30. The Consul's letter advised him of the finding 
of inadmissibility under § 212 (a) (28) in 1962, the 
waivers in that year and in 1968, and the current denial 
of a waiver. It said, however, that another request 
for waiver was being forwarded to Washington in con-
nection with Mandel's second application for a visa. 
4 Entry presumably was claimed as a nonimmigrant alien under 
§ 101 (a) (15) (H) (i) of the Ac1, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (n) (15) (Jf)(i), 
namely, "an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has 
no intention of abandoning ... who i of di~tinguishrd mrrit and 
ability and who i~ coming temporarily to the United States 1o per-
form services of an exceptional nature requiring such mrrit and 
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The Department of State, through its Bureau of Security 
and Consular Affairs and by a letter dated Novem-
ber 6 to Mandel's New York attorney, asserted that 
the earlier waivers had been granted on condition that 
Mandel conform to his itinerary and limit his activities 
to the stated purposes of his trip, but that on his 1968 
visit he had engaged in activities beyond the stated 
purposes. For this reas011, it was said, a waiver "was 
not sought in connection with his September visa ap-
plication." The Department went on to say, however, 
that it had now learned that Mandel might not have 
been aware i11. 1968 of the conditions and limitations 
attached to his visa issuance, and that, in view of this 
and upon his assurances tha,t he would conform to his 
stated itinerary and purposes, the Department was re-
considering his case. On December 1 the Consul at 
Brussels informed Mandel that his visa had been refused. 
The Department of State in fact had recommended 
to the Attorney General that Mandel's ineligibility be 
waived with respect to his October visa application. 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, 
acting on behalf of the Attorney General, see 28 U. S. C. 
§ 510, in a letter dated February 13, 1970, to New York 
counsel stated that it had determined that Mandel'i'.l 
1968 activities while in the United States "went far 
beyond the stated purposes of his trip, on the basis of 
which his admission had been authorized and repre-
sented a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded 
him to express his views in this country." The letter 
concluded that favorable exercise of discretion, provided 
for under the Act, was not warranted and that Mandel's 
temporary admission was not authorized. 
Mandel's address to the New York meeting was thf'n 
delivered by transatlantic telephone. 
In March Mandel and six of the other appellees in-
stituted the present action against the Attorney Gen-
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eral and the Secretary ot State. The two rcmarnrng 
appcllccs soon came into the lawsuit by an amendment 
to the complaint. All the appellces who joined Mandel 
in this action are United States citizens and are uni-
versity professors in various fields of the social sciences. 
They arc persons who in vitcd Ma.ndel to speak at uni-
versities and other forums in the United States or who 
expected to participate in colloqu~,.ifh him so that, 
as the complaint alleged, "they may hear his views 
and engage him in a free and open academic exchange." 
The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes in question are 
unconstitutional on their face and as applied and that 
their application to Mandel was arbitrary and unreason-
able. The American plaintiffs urged that Mandel's ex-
clusion violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights 
and that §§ 212 (a) (28) and ( d)(3) (A) arc void on 
their face and as applied in that they were denied both 
equal protection and due process. Declaratory and in-
junctive relief wa.s sought. 
A three-judge district court ,vas duly convened. The 
case was tried on the pleadings and affidavits " ·ith ex-
hibits. T,,·o judges held that, although Mandel had 
no personal right to enter the U11it€d States, citizens 
of this country have a First Amendment right to have 
him enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend 
his views. The court then entered a declaratory judg-
ment that § 212 (a) (28) and § 212 ( d)(3) (A) were in-
valid and void insofar as they had been or might be 
invoked by the defendants to find Mandel ineligible for 
admission. The defendants ,vere enjoined from imple-
menting and enforcing those statutes so as to deny 
Mandel admissions as a nonimrnigrant visitor. Judge 
Bartels dissented. 325 F. Supp. 620 (EDNY 1971). 
Probable jurisdiction " ·as noted. 404 U. S. 1013 ( 1972). 
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II 
Until 1875 alien migration to tho United States was 
unrestricted. The Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477. 
barred convicts and prostitutes. SeveJJ years later Con-
gress passed the first general immigration statute. Act 
of August 3. 1882, 22 Stat. 214. Other legislation fol-
lowed. A general revision of the immigration laws was 
effected by tho Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213- 1222. 
Section 2 of that Act made ineligible for admission 
"anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the 
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of 
the United States or of all government or of all forms 
of law." By the Act of October 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012, 
Congress expanded tho provisions for the exclusion of 
subversive aliens. Title II of the Alien Registration 
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670, 671, amended the 1918 Act 
to bar aliens "·ho, at any time, had advocated or 
wore members of or affiliated with organizations that 
advocated violent overthro,v of the United States 
Government. 
In the years that followed. after extensive investiga-
tion and numerous reports by congressional committees, 
see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board, 367 U. S. 1, 94, u. 37 (1961) , Congress passed 
the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. This 
Act disp<'nsod with tho requirement of the 1940 Act of 
a finding in each case, ,rith respect to members of the 
Communist Party , that the party did in fact advocate 
violent overthrow of the Government. These provisions 
were carried forward into the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952. 
We thus have almost continuous attention on the 
part of Congress since 1875 to the problems of immi-
gration and of excludability of certain defined classes 
8 
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of aliens. The pattern generally has been one of in-
creasing control with particular attention, for almost 
70 years now, first to anarchists and then to those with 
communist affiliation or views. 
III 
It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unaclmitted 
and nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of 
entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise. 
United Sta.tes ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 
292 (1904); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 
338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950); Galvan v. Kress, 347 U. S. 
522, 530-532 (1954); see Harisia.des v. Shaughnessy, 
342 U. S. 580, 592 (1952). 
The appellees concede this. Brief, at 33, Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 28. Indeed, the American appellees assert that 
"they sue to enforce their rights, individually and as 
members of the American public, and assert none on 
the part of the invited alien." Brief, at 14. "Dr. Mandel 
is in a sense made a plaintiff because he is symbolic of 
the problem," Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. 
The case, therefore, comes down to the narrow issue 
whether the First Amendment confers upon the appellee 
professors, because they wish to hear, speak, and debate 
with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that 
Mandel should be permitted to enter the country or, 
in other·words, to compel the Attorney General to allow 
Mandel's admission. 
IV 
In a variety of contexts this Court has held that the 
First Amendment protects the right to "receive infor-
mation and ideas," the freedom to hear as well as the 
freedom to speak. 
"It is now well established that the Constitution 
protects the right to receive information and ideas. 
'· 
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'This freedom [of speech and press] ... necessarily 
protects the right to receive ... .' Martin v. City 
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) .... " Stan-
ley Y. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969). 
This was one basis for the decision in Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). The Court there held that 
a labor organizer's right to speak and the rights of 
workers "to hear what he had to say," id., at 534, were 
both abridged by a state law requiring organizers to 
register before soliciting union membership. In a very 
different situation, Mn. JUSTICE WHITE, speaking for 
a unanimous Court upholding the FCC's "fairness doc-
trine" in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 
367, 386-390 (1969), said: 
"It is the purpose of the First Amendment to pre-
serve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which 
truth will ultimately prevail . . . . It is the right 
of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and ex-
periences which is crucial here. That right may 
not be constitutionally abridged either by Congress 
or by the FCC." Id., at 390. 
And in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 
( 1965), the Court held that a statute permitting the 
Government to hold "communist political propaganda" 
arriving in the mails from abroad unless the addre~sce 
affirmatively requested in writing that it be delivered 
to him placed an "unjustifiable burden" on the addressee's 
First Amendment rights. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, con-
curring and joined by two other Justices, stated, "I 
think the right to receive publications is ... a funda-
mental right." Id., at 308. This Court has recognized 
that this right is "nowhere more vital" than in our 
schools a.nd universities. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 
479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Ha,npshire, 354 U. S .. 
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234, 250 ( 1957) ( opinion of Chief Justice Warren); 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967). 
See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 ( 1968). 
In the present case, the District Court majority held: 
"The concern of the First Amendment is not with 
a non-resident alien's individual and personal in-
terest in entering and being heanl, but with the 
rights of the citizens of the country to have the 
alien enter and to hear him explain and seek to 
defend his views; that, as Garrison [v. Louisiana, 
379 U. S. 64 (1964) J, and Red Lion observe, is of 
the essence of self-government." 325 F. Supp., at 
631. 
The Government disputes this conclusion on two grounds. 
First, it argues that exclusion of Mandel involves no 
restriction on First Amendment rights at all since what 
is restricted is "only action-the action of the alien 
coming into this country." Brief, at 29. Principal 
reliance is placed on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), 
where the Government's refusal to validate an American 
passport for travel to Cuba was upheld. The rights 
asserted there were those of the passport applicant him-
self. The Court held that his right to travel and his 
asserted ancillary right to inform himself about Cuba 
did not outweigh substantial "foreign policy consid-
erations affecting all citizens" that, with the backdrop 
of the Cuban missile crisis, were characterized as the 
"weightiest considerations of national security." Id., 
at 13, 16. The rights asserted here, in some contrast, 
are those of American academics who have invited Man-
del to participate with them in colloquia, debates, and 
discussion in the United States. In light of the Court's 
previous decisions concerni11g the "right to receive in-
formation," we cannot realistically say that the problem 
faci11g us disappears entirely or is nonexistent because 
71-lG-OPINION 
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the mode of regulatiot bears directly on physical move-
ment. In Thomas the registration r('quirernent on its 
face concerned only action. In Lamont too, the face 
of the regulation dealt only with the Government's un-
disputed po\\"er to control physical entry of mail into 
the country. See United Slates v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 
263 ( 1067). 
The Government also suggests that the First Amend-
ment is inapplicable because appellees have free access 
to Mandel's ideas through his books and speeches, and 
because "technological developments," such as tapes or 
telephone hook-ups, readily supplant his physical pres-
ence. This argument overlooks what may be particular 
qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, dis-
cussion and questioning. While alternative means of 
access to Mandel's ideas might be a relevant factor were 
we called upon to balance First Amendment rights against 
governmental regulatory interests-a balance we find un-
necessary here in light of the discussion that follows in 
Part V-wo are loath to hold on this record that existence 
of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any consti-
tutional intere::;t on the part of the appellees in this 
particular form of access. 
V 
Recognition that First Amendment rights are impli-
cated, however, is not dispositivo of our inquiry here. 
In accord with ancient principles of tho international law 
of nation-states, the Court in The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889), and in Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), held broadly, as the 
Government describes it, Brief, at 20, that the power 
to exclude aliens is "inherent in sovereignty, necessary for 
maintaining normal international relations and defend-
ing the country against foreign encroachments and 
dangers-a power to be exercised exclusively by the po-
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the Court's geueral reaffirmations of this prinicple have 
been legion.5 The Court without exception has sustained 
Congress' "plenary power to make rules for the admission 
of aliens and to exclude those who possess those character-
istics which Congress has forbidden." Boutilier v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, 387 U. S. 118, 123 
(1967). "[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative 
power of Congress more complete than it is over" the 
admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stran-
ahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909). In Lem Moon Sing v. 
United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547 (1895), the first Mr. 
Justice Harlan said, 
"The power of Congress to exclude aliens alto-
gether from the United States, or to prescribe the 
terms and conditions upon which they may come to 
this country, and to have its declared policy in that 
regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, 
without judicial intervention, is settled by our previ-
ous adjudications." 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter ably articulated this history in 
Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1954), a deportation 
case, and we can do no better. After suggesting, at 530, 
that "much could be said for the view" that due process 
places some limitations on congresssional power in this 
area "were we writing on a clean slate," he continued: 
"But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of 
the power of Congress under review, there is not 
merely a 'page of history' ... but a whole volume. 
Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their 
right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with 
6 See, for example, El,;iu v. Unit ed States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); 
Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 302 (1902); United 
States ex rel. Turner v. Wiliiams, 194 U. S. 279, 294 (1904); Keller 
v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 143-144 (1909); Mahler v. Eby, 264 
U.S. 32, 40 (1924); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U, S. 206,210 (1953); 
cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,377 (1!)71). 
- ; , 
'. 
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the political conduct of government. In the enforce-
ment of these policies, the Executive Branch of the 
Government must respect the procedural safeguards 
of due process. . . . But that the formulation of 
these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has 
become about as firmly embedded in the legislative 
and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect 
of our government. . . . 
"We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or 
more sensitve to human rights than our predecessors, 
especially those who have been most zealous in pro-
tecting civil liberties under the Constitution, and 
must therefore under our constitutional system recog-
nize congressional power in dealing with aliens .... " 
Id., at 531-532. 
We are not inclined in the present context to reconsider 
this line of cases. Indeed, the appellees, in contrast to 
the amicus, do not ask that we do so. The appellees 
recognize the force of these many precedents. In seeking 
to sustain the decision below, they concede that Congress 
could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all 
aliens falling into the class defined by § 212 (a) (28) (D) 
and (G)(v), and that First Amendment rights could not 
override that decision. Brief, at 16. But they contend 
that by providing a waiver procedure, Congress clearly 
intended that persons ineligible under the broad pro-
vision of the section would be temporarily admitted when 
appropriate "for humane reasons and for reasons of pub-
lic interest." S. Rep. No. 1137, Committee on the Ju-
diciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1952). They argue that 
the Executive's implementation of this congressional 
mandate through decision whether to grant a waiver in 
each individual case must be limited by the First Amend-
ment rights of persons like appellees. Specifically, their 
position is that the First Amendment rights must prevail 
at least where the Government advances no justification 
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whasoever for failing to grant a waiver. They point to 
the fact that waivers have been granted in the vast ma-
jority of cases." 
Appellees' First ;\mendment argument would prove 
too much. In almost every instance of an alien exclud-
able under § 212 (a) (28), there are probably those who 
would wish to meet and speak with him. The ideas of 
most such aliens might not be so influential as those of 
Mandel, nor his American audience so numerous, nor the 
planned discussion forums so impressive. But the First 
Amendment does not protect only the articulate, the well 
known, and the popular. ·were we to endorse the propo-
sition that governmental power to withhold a waiver must 
yield whenever a bona fide claim is made that American 
citizens wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable 
under § 212 (a)(28), one of two unsatisfactory results 
would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would pre-
vail, in which case the plenary discretionary authority 
Congress granted the Executive becomes a nullity, or 
courts in each case would be required to weigh the 
6 The Government 's brief states : 
"The Immigration and Naturalization SerYice reports the following 
with respect to applications to the Attorney General for waiver of 







Total Number of Numlwr Number 
Applications for of of 
Waiver of Waiver~ Waivers 
Section 212 (a) (28) Granted Denied 
6210 6196 14 
6193 6189 4 







Brief 18, n. 24. Thei:;e ra ~e::;, however, arc only those that, :rn § 212 
(cl) (3) (A) provides, come to the Attornc)· General with a po~itiYe 
recommendation from the Secretary of State or the consular officer. 
The figures do not include those cases where either of these offi cials 
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strength of the audience's interest against that of the Gov-
ernment in refusing a waiver to the particular alien appli-
cant, according to some as yet undetermined standard. 
The dangers a11d the undesirability of making that de-
termination on the basis of factors such as the size of the 
audience or the probity of the speaker's ideas are obvious. 
Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that the waiver de-
cision has, properly, been placed in the hands of the 
Executive. 
Appellees seek to soften the impact of this analysis by 
arguing that the First Amendment claim should prevail 
at least where the Executive advances no justification at 
all for denial of a waiver. Brief 26. The Government 
would have us reach this question, urging a broad de-
cision that Congress has delegated the waiver decision to 
the Executive in its sole and unfettered discretion , and 
any reason or no reason may be given. See Jay v. Boyd, 
351 U. S. 345, 357- 358 (1956); Hintopoulos v. Shaugh-
nessy, 353 U. S. 72, 77 (1957); Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 
U. S. 405. 408 (1960). This record, however, does not 
require that we do so, for the Attorney General did inform 
Mandel's counsel of the reason for refusing him a waiver. 
And that reason was facially legitimate and bona fide. 
The Government has chosen not to rely on the letter 
to counsel either in the District Court or here. The fact 
remains, however, that the official empowered to make 
the decision stated that he denied a waiver because he 
concluded that previous abuses by Mandel that were 
contrary to the Government's interests made it inap-
propriate to grant a waiver again. With this, we think 
the Attorney General validly exercised the plenary power 
which Congress delegated to the Executive by § 212 (a) 
(28) and (d)(3). 
In summary, plenary congressional power to make 
policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been 
firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable 
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under § 212 (a) (28), Congress has delegated conditional 
exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that 
when the Executive exercises this power negatively on 
the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the 
courts will neither look behind the exercise of that dis-
cretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against 
the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal 
communication with the applicant. What First Amend-
ment or other grounds may be available for attacking 
exercise of discretion for which no justification whatso-
ever is advanced is a question we neither address nor 





No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. Mandel 
Mr. JUSTICE MARSHALL dissenting. 









internationally famous Marxist scholar and journalist. He 
was invited to our country by a group of American scholars 
who wished to meet him for discussion and debate. With firm 
plans for conferences, colloquia, and lectures, · the American 
hosts were stunned to learn that Mandel had been refused per-
mission to enter our country. American consular officials had 
found Mandel "ineligible" to receive a visa under §212 (a) (28) 
lQf th~J_mrn i r a ti0n Ac t;.-.J.J 
(D) and (G) (v) which bars even temporary visits to the United 
States by aliens who "advocate the economic, international and 
governmental doctrines of wor ld communism" or "who write or 
publish any written or printed matter*** advocating or 
teaching * * * 11 such doctrines. Under §212 (d) (3), the Attorney 
General refused to waive ineligibility. 
I, too, am stunned to learn that a country with our 
proud heritage has refused Dr. Mandel temporary admission. I 
am convinced that Americans cannot be c1.enied the opportunity 
to hear Dr. Mandel's views in person because their government 








As the majority correctly observes, "In a variety of 
contexts this Court has held that the First Amendment protects 
the right to 'receive information and ideas,' the freedom to 
hear as well as the freedom to speak. " The reason for this is 
that the First Amendment protects a process - in Justice 
Brandeis' words, "reason as applied through public discussion," 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring 
opinion) - and the right to speak and hear are inextricably 
part of that process. The freedom to speak and the freedom 
to hear are inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin. 
But the coin itself is the process of thought and discussion. 
The activity of speakers becoming listeners and listeners be-
coming speakers in the vital interchange of thought is the 
"means indispensible to the discovery and spread of political 
truth." Id.; see Terrniniello v. Chic~o, 337 U.S. l, 4 (1949). 
Its protection is "a fundamental principle of the Ame rican 
government." Whitney v. California, _§_Upr~ at 375. The First 
Amendment means that government has no power to thwart the 
process of free discussion, to "abridge" the freedoms necessary 
to make that process work. See Lamont v. Po~tmaster General, 
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Br•:nnan, J., concurr-'ng, with whom 
Goldberg, J., andHarl ;:,.:1 , J., joined). 










There can be no doubt that by denying the American 
appellees access to Dr. Mandel, governme nt has directly 
11 
prevented the £ree interchang·e of ideas. It has, of course, 
interfered with appellees' personal rights both to hear 
Mandel's views and to develop and articulate their own views 
through interaction with Mandel. But as the court below 
recognized, apart from appellees' interests, there is also 
a "general public interest in the prevention of any stifling 
of political utterance." 325 F.Supp. 620, 632 (1971). And 
2:./ 
government has interfered with this as well. 
II 
\ 
What is the justification for this extraordinary govern-
mental interference with the liberty of American citizen s ? And 
by what reasoning does the Court uphold Mandel's e xclusion? 
It is established constitutional doctrine, after all, that 
7 
government may restrict First Amendme nt rights only if the l-- ~ ,. 
'I ' , 
restriction is necessary to furth e r a compelling governme ntal>1'~ ---- ·-~ - ~' interest. E.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, supra at 308;,-..... ,1-,o 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Gibson v. FJ~ 
Legislative Conunittee, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); Shelton v.~ ~ 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (196U). 
A. Today's majority apparently holds that Mandel may 
be excluded and Americans' First Amendment rights abridged 
because the Attorney General has given a "facially legitimate 




I, , . . ,
4 
ineligibility. I do not understand the source of the queer 
standard. Merely "legitimate" governmental interests cannot 
override Constitutional rights. Moreover, the majority demands 
only "facial" legitimacy and good faith, by which it means that 
this Court will never "look behind" any reason the Attorney 
General gives. No citation is given for this kind of un-
precedented deference to the Executive, nor can I imagine 
l/ 
(nor am I told) the slightest justification for such a rule. 
Even the briefest peek behind the Attorney General's 
reason for refusing a waiver in this case would show that it 
is a sham. The Attorney General informed appellees' counsel 
that the waiver was refused because Mandl' l's activities on a 
previous American visit "went far beyond the stated purposes 
of his trip * * * and represented a flagrant abuse of the 
opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country 
* * *." App. 68. But, as the Department of State had already 
conceded to appellees' counsel, Dr. Mandel "was apparently 
not informed that [his previous] visa was issued only after 
obtaining a waiver of ineligibility and therefore [he] may not 
have been aware of the conditions and limitations attached to 
the [previous] visa issuance." App. 22. There is no basis in 
the present record for concluding tliat Mandel's behavior on 
his previous visit was a "flagrant abuse" - or even wilful or 
knowing departure - from visa restrictions. For good reason, 
\'''·' 
5 
the Government in this litigation has never relied on the 
Attorney General's reason to justify Mandel's exclusion. 
these circumstances, the Attorney General's reason cannot 
In 
possibly support a decision for the Government in this case. 
But without even remanding for a factual hearing to see if 
there is any support for the Attorney General's determination, 
the majority declares that his reason is sufficient to override 
appellees' First Amendment interests. 
B. Even if the Attorney General had given a sufficiently 
compelling reason for declining to grant a waiver under Section 
212 (d) (3) (A), this would not, for me, end the case. As I 
understand the statutory scheme, Mandel is "ineligible" for a 
visa, and therefore "inadmissible," solely because, under 
Section 212 (a) (28), he has adm cated communist doctrine and 
has published writings advocating that doctrine. The waiver 
question under Section 212(d) (3) (A) is totally secondary and 
dependent, since it may be triggered only by a determination of 
(a) (28) "inadmissibility." The h ttorney General's refusal to 
waive "inadmissibility" does not itself generate a new statutory 
basis for inadmissibility; the Attorney General has no roving 
power to set new ad hoc standards for visa ineligibility. 
Rather, the Attorney General's refusal to waive inadmissibility 
simply has the same effect as if no waiver provision existed; 


















Thus, even if the Attorney General has a good reason for 
refusing a waiver, this Court, I think, must still face the 
question it tries to avoid: under our Constitution, may Mandel 
be declared inadmissible under (a) (28)? 
C. In any event, since it is clear to me that the 
Attorney General's asserted reason is insufficient to exclude 
Mandel, I turn to the sole justification urged by the Govern-
·+ 
ment here or below - that ti\-e~lv:~rament has the power to ex-
clude Mandel in this case because he "advocates" and "publishes 
* * * printed matter * * *advocating*** doctrines of world 
communism." Section 212 (a) (28). 
Still adhering to standard First Amendment doctrine, I 
do not see how (a) (28) can possibly represent a compelling 
governmental interest to override appellees' interests in hearing 
Mandel. Unlike (a) (27) or (a) (29), (a) (28) does not claim to -
exclude aliens who represe·.;. t an active and present threat to 
national security. Rather, (a) (28) excludes aliens solely 
because they have advocated communist doctrine. Our cases 
make clear, however, that government has no legitimate interest 
in stopping the flow of ideas. It has no power to res tr ic t the 
mere advocacy of communist doctrine, divorced from incitement 
to imminent lawless action. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 








The First Amendment represents the view of the Framers that 
" [ t] he pa th of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss 
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that 
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones," "more 
speech." Whitne_y v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring). Where Americans want to hear about 
Marxist doctrine, even from advocates, government cannot prevent 
them simply because it does not approve of the ideas. It cer-
tainly may not selectively pick and choose which ideas it will 
let into the country. Cf. Police Department v. Mosley, U.S. 
(1972). But, as the court below put it, Section 212 (a) (28) 
is nothing more than "a means of restraining the entry of disfavored 
political doctrine," 325 F.Supr. 620, 626 (1971), and such an 
enactment cannot justify the abridgment of appellees' First 
Amendment rights. 
In saying these things, I am merely repeating established ; ~ 
First Amendment law. Indeed, this Court has already applied that 
law in a case concerning the entry of communist doctrine from 
foreign lands. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 
(1965), this Court held that the right of an American addressee 
to receive communist political propaganda from abroad could not 
be fettered by requiring the addressee to request in writing its 
delivery from the Post Offjce. See, id. at 308 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). The burden imposed on the right to receive 
.... ,. 
, .. 
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8 
information in our case is far greater than in Lamont, with 
far less justification. In Lamont, the challenged law merely 
regulated the flow of mail, and required the Postmaster Ge neral 
to forward detained mail immediately upon request by the 
addressee. By contrast, through Section 212(a) (28), the 
Government claims absolute power to bar Mandel permanently 
from academic meetings in this country. Moreove r, in Lamont, 
the government argued that its interest was not to censor 
content but rather to protect Americans from receiving unwanted 
mail. Here, Mandel's exclusion is not incident to a legitimate 
regulatory objective, but is based directly on the subject 
matter of his beliefs . 
D. The heart of the Government's position in this case, 
and the basis for its distinguishing Lamont, is that its power is 
distinctively broad and unreviewable becaui:ie "the re ~rulation 
in question is directed at the admission of aliens." Brief, 
p. 33. Thus, in the Government's view, this case is no different 
from a long line of cases holding that the power to exclude aliens 
is left exclusively to the "political" branches of government, 
Congress and the Executive. 
These cases are not the strongest precedents in the 
U.S. Reports, and the majority's baroque approach reveals its 
reluctance to rely on them completely. They include such 









and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 691' (1893), in 
which this Court held that the right to expel Chinese aliens 
from our midst is "inherent in sovereignty." 
But none of these old cases must be "reconsidered" or 
overrule~ to strike down Dr. Mandel's exclusion, for none of 
them was concerned with the rights of American citizens. At 
least where the rights of Americans are involved, there is no 
basis for concluding that the power 1 o exclude aliens is absolute. 
"When Congress' exercise of its enumerated powers clashes with 
those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, 
it is our 'delicate and difficult task' to determine whether 
the resulting restriction on freedom can be tolerated." Robel v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1 96 7). As Rob el and other 
cases described in footnote 5 show, all governmenta l ~ower--
even the war power, the power to maintain national security, 
and the power to conduct foreign affairs--is limited by the 
.v 
Bill of Rights. When individual freedoms are at stake, we do 
not blindly defer to broad claims 
lt):L~.J 
ofJ Legislative or Executive, 
powm;;., but rather we consider these claims i r light of the 
individual freedoms. This should be our approach in the p resent 
case, even though the Government urges that the question of 
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10 
The majority recognizes that the right of American 
citizens to hear Mandel is "implicated" in our case. There 
were no rights of Americans involved in a.ny of the old alien 
exclusion cases, and therefore their broad counsel about 
deference to the political branches is inapplicable. Surely 
a Court which can distinguish between pre-indictment and post-
indictment lineups, Kirby v. Illinois, u. s. (1972) , can 
distinguish between our case and cases which involve only the 
rights of aliens. 
I do not mean to suggest that simply because a group of 
Americans wish to hear an alien speak, they can automatically 
compel even his temporary admission to our country. Go\ ornment 
can prohibit aliens from even temporary admission if exclusion 
21 
is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 
Actual threats to the national security, public health need r-: , 
and genuine requirements of law enforcement are the most 
apparent interests which would surely be compelling. But in 
Dr. Mandel's case, the Government has, and claims, no such 
compelling interest. We are concerned here only with temporary 
drn · · th t b 
11 
• • t n 1 d a issiom to e coun ry y nonirnrnigran 5, a c ass not covere 
by quotas. Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure 
§2.6 (1971). Mandel's "ineligibility" for a visa is based 




embodied in that section iu that the government wants to keep 
certain ideas out of circulation in this country. This is 
hardly a compelling governmental interest. Section (a) (28) 
may not be the basis for excluding an alien where Americans 
wish to hear him. Without any claim that Mandel "live" is an 
actual threat to this country, there is no difference between 
excluding Mandel because of his ideas and keeping his books out 
because of its ideas. Neither is permitted. Lamont v. Post-
master General, supra. 
III 
Dr. Mandel has written about his exclusion, concluding 
that " [ i] t demonstrates a lack of confidence" on the part of 
our government "in the capacity of its supporters to combat 
Marxism on the battleground of ideas." He observes that he 
"would not be carrying any high explosives, if I had come, but 
only, as I did before, my revolutionary views which are well 
known to the public." And he wryly notes that "In the nine-
teenth century the British ruling class, which was sure of 
itself, permitted Karl Marx to live as an exile in England 
for about forty years." Appendix 54. 
The government does not dispute that Dr. Mandel's brief 
trip would involve nothing but a series of scholarly conferences 
and lectures. •ro follow the path of the Government in this 






fearless acceptance of free discussion. r;y deferring to the 
Executive, this Court departs from its own best role as the 
guardian of individual liberty in the face of governmental 
overreaching. Principles of judicial restraint designed to 
allow the policial branches to protect national security have 
no place in this dispute. Dr. Mandel should be admitted for 
his brief visit. 
I dissent. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Twenty years a go, tb ::, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
devoted an entire issue to the problem of American visa policy 
and its effect on the interchange of ideas between American 
scholars and scientists and their foreign counterparts. The 
general conclusion of the Editors - supported by printed 
statements of such men as Albert Einstein, Hans Bethe, Harold 
Urey, Arthur Compton, Michael Polyani, Raymond Aron, and J. 
Coulomb - was that American visa policy was injurious to the 
development of American science and American intellectual 
development, and harmful to our prestige abroad. Volume VIII, 
No. 7, October 1952, pp. 210-17 (statement of Special Editor 
Edward Shils). The detrimental effect of American visa pol.icy 
on the free exchange of ideas continues to be reported. See 
Note, Opening the Floodgates to Dissident Aliens, 6 Harv. Civ. 
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 141, 143-49 (1970); Bull, of the 
Atomic Scientists, Vol. XI, December 1955, pp. 367-73. 
2. The availability to appellees of Mandel's books and taped 
lectures is no substitute for live, face to face debate, just 
as the availability to us of briefs and exhibits does not 
supplant the essential place of oral argument in this Court's 
work. 
3. Compare Frankel, Bench Warrants Upon the Prosecutor's 
Demand, 71 Col. L. Rev 403, 414 (1971). (The writer is the 
distinguished United States District Judge.) 
4. The majority suggests that appellees "concede that Congress 
could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all aliens 
falling into the class defined by §212(a) (28) (D) and G(v) and 
that First Amendment rights could not override that decision." 
This was certainly not the view of the court below, whose 
judgmcn t the Gov~nm..§_!2 t alone has challenged here and appellees 
have moved to affirm. It is true that appe llees have argued to 
this Court a ground of decision in alternative to that argued 
and adopted below; but they have hardly conceded the in-
correctness of what they successfully ar9uc d below. They have 
simply noted at p. 16 of their Brief that even if this Court 
rejects the broad decision below, there would neverthele s s be a 
separate and narrower basis for affirmance. See Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 24, 25-26, 41-42. 
. 
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5. In Robel, this Court struck down a statute making it a 
criminal offense for any employee of a "defense facility" to 
remain a member of the Communist Party, in spite of Government 
claims that the enactment came within the "war power." In 
Aptheker v. Secr~t~.£.Y._Qf State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the Govern-
ment unsuccessfully sought to defend the denial of passports 
to American members of the Communist Party, in spite of claimed 
threats to the national security. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 
(1965), the passport restriction on travel to Cuba was upheld, 
but the Court rejected any assumption "that simply because a 
statute deals with foreign relations, it can grant the executive 
totally unrestricted freedom of choice." Id at 17. In 
Schneider v. Ru~k, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the Government un-
successfully attempted to justify a statutory inequality 
between naturalized and native-born citizens under the foreign 
relations power. And in Lamont itself, as Justice Brennan noted, 
the Government urged that the statute was "justified by the 
object of avoiding· the subsidization of propaganda of foreign 
governments which bar American propaganda;" Justice Brennan 
answered that Government must act "by means and on terms which 
do not endanger First Amendment rights." Id at 310. 
6. I agree with the majority that courts should not inquire 
into such things as the "probity of the speaker's ideas." 
Neither should t.11. Executive, however. Where Americans wish 
to hear an alien, and their claim is not a demonstrated sham, 
the crucial question is whether the QQyernment's interest in 
excluding the alien is compelling. 
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